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taining service pursuant to section 308(4), holds in effect that an
endeavor to serve a defendant outside the state under section 313
is not a condition precedent to the use of section 308(4) .23
Section 302(a) (2) - Commission of a "Tortious Act"
Section 302 (a) (2) of the CPLR provides that a non-domicil-
iary is subject to in personam jurisdiction if the cause of action
arises out of his commission of a tortious act within the state.
An interesting case, and one which has taken a restrictive approach
to section 302 (a) (2), is Feathers v. McLucas.24
In that case, the defendant Darby Corporation, incorporated
under the laws of, and having its only place of business in
Kansas, had no direct contacts with New York. It manu-
factu-ed cargo pressure tanks used for the transportation of
liquefied petroleum products. Darby sold one of these tanks to a
Missouri corporation, having its principal place of business in
that state; this vendee affixed the tank to a trailer chassis and
wheels. The completed tank trailer was sold to a Pennsylvania
corporation engaged in interstate commerce. While this trailer
was being driven through New York to Vermont, the tank ruptured
and exploded, giving rise to an alleged cause of action for per-
sonal injuries and property damage. Relying on section 302(a) (2),
the plaintiff served the president of the defendant Darby Cor-
poration in Kansas, which is permissible under section 313
in a section 302 case. The defendant successfully moved to set
service aside (i.e., made a motion under rule 3211 (a) (8)), con-
tending that the court lacked in personam jurisdiction.
In resolving this issue, the court examined the cases decided
under the Illinois "longarm statute," Section 17 of the Illinois
Practice Act, on which section 302(a) is based, and adopted
the distinction between a tortious act and a tortious injury, as
drawn by a federal district court in Illinois in Hellriegel v. Sears
avenues have been exhausted unsuccessfully." 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR
§ 3C8, commentary 475.
23 The fact that § 308 (service in New York) precedes § 313 (service
outside New York) indicates that §308(4) clearly contemplates only the
exhaustion of in-state service under § 308(1)-(3) without reference to
extra-state service under § 313. In any event, that numerical position of
§ 308(4) offers good ground for such a determination. As a practical
matter, §308(4) might become a comparatively useless tool if, before an
order could be moved for under it, service in a foreign nation had to be
resorted to. If the service ordered under § 308(4) is such as to satisfy due
process-and in the Totero case the agent designated for service seemed
a reliable source to assure that the defendant would be notified- it seems
preferable to permit application for an order under § 308(4) without
requiring that extra-state service first be attempted under § 313.
2441 Misc. 2d 498, 245 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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Roebuck & Co. 25 Thus, while the tortious act, the construction
of the tank, was performed in Kansas, the tortious injury occurred
in New York. Seizing upon the language of section 302(a)(2)
to the effect that a defendant is subject to jurisdiction if "in per-
son or through an agent, he . .. commits a tortious act within the
state," the court drew the "act-injury" distinction in finding that
the act was committed in Kansas.26  Thus, the court held that
the occurrence of the injury in New York will not suffice; the
"tortious act" must be committed here.
A fact situation similar to Feathers arose in the controversial
Illinois case of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp.27  In Gray, the Illinois court sustained jurisdiction on the
theory that "the place of a wrong is where the last event takes
place which is necessary to render the actor liable." 28 It also
noted that it was impossible to separate the alleged tortious
act, i.e., the out-of-state manufacture of a water heater, from the
injury within the state.
Recognizing that a manufacturer rarely does business directly
with consumers, the court in Gray stated:
[I]t is not unreasonable, where a cause of action arises from alleged defects
in his product, to say that the use of such products in the ordinary course
of commerce is sufficient contact with this State to justify a requirement
that he defend here. 29
It is thus apparent that Feathers is directly contra to Gray,
the latter sustaining jurisdiction when only the injury occurs within
the jurisdiction. With respect to the "act-injury" distinction,
the Feathers result is the same as the Hellriegel case, and to
this extent the Feathers position is not without some authority
(albeit authority which appeared before the Gray case was decided).
To be contrasted with Feathers is the case of Fornabaio v.
Sissair Transp. Co.30 Plaintiff, a Port Authority employee, was
injured on property leased to Swissair at New York's Kennedy
International Airport. It was alleged that defendant S. & C.
Electric Company sold equipment to Westinghouse Electric Sup-
ply Corporation, which in turn sold it to defendant Swissair.
It was further contended that the equipment was defectively
25 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
26Accord, Muraco v. Ferentino, 247 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. 1964),
where, on facts almost identical to those in the case of Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961),
the supreme court adopted the "act-injury" distinction and granted a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.2T Supra note 26.28d. at 434-35, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63.291d. at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
80247 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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manufactured by S. & C. and that this defect was the cause of
the injury to plaintiff.
Defendant S. & C., in support of its motion to vacate service
under rule 3211(a)(8), alleged that it was a Delaware cor-
poration and that it did no business in New York. In con-
sidering the issue of jurisdiction under section 302(a) (2), the
court cited, with approval the Illinois Gray case.81 The court
made a factual determination that "defendant's products are used
and consumed in this state in, sufficient quantity and this de-
fendant knew that its product was being shipped to New York
for us [sic] therein." 82 On 'this basis the court suggested that
sufficient "contact" with New York was present. No reference
was made to the Feathers decision.
Perhaps the distinguishing factor between Feathers and Forn-
abaio lies in the statement above quoted. However, the distinction
is of questionable validity. The Feathers case did not rely on
the quantity of the defendant's New York contacts; it held,
simply, that if the tortious act occurred outside the state, section
302(a)(2) is inapplicable. There is some merit in defendant's
contention that it committed no act in the state and that section
302 (a) (2) requires such act, but this was not held to be a bar in
the analogous Gray case under a similarly worded statute. Sup-
porting the Fornabaio case is Lewin v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co.,83 which distinguished Feathers as involving only an "isolated"
contact that defendant had with New York.
Section 302(a) (3) - Real Property 4ctivities
The only significant case interpreting section 302(a)(3) is
Hem pstead Medical Arts Co. v. Willie.34 In that case, defendant
rented office space in New York from plaintiff. During the term
of the lease he vacated the premises and defaulted in his payment
of rent. At the time of the commencement of this action for rent
due and for expenses incurred in re-letting the premises, defendant
was a domiciliary of Maine. His motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction under rule 3211(a) (8) was denied. The court held
that jurisdiction existed by virtue of section 302 (a) (3), since the
action arose out of defendant's use or possession of real property
located in the state.8 5
81 Supra note 26.
82Fornabaio v. Swissair Transport Co., 247 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
3 (Sup. Ct, Kings County), 151 N.Y.L.J., Apr. 15, 1964, p. 17, col. 1.
84 (Sup. Ct., Nassau County), 150 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 9, 1963, p. 18, col. 6.
35 There is as yet no reported case on § 302(a) (3).
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